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New Religious Movements and the Problem of
Extremism in Modern Russia
Veronika V. Kravchouk∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The liberal transition-era policies of the early 1990s following the
dissolution of Communism led to the emergence of new foreign and
domestic religious movements previously unknown in Russia. The
dynamic proliferation of new religious movements and the demands
of social, economic, and cultural transition have confronted the
government with new and diverse pressures. These increased
pressures on the Russian government have been especially poignant
as the government has adopted legislation to address extremist
activity and regulation of new religious movements.1
Appropriately categorizing new religious movements for
purposes of legislation and law enforcement, however, has proven
difficult and controversial because classifying a religious group as a
cult or sect rather than as a genuine religion has real consequences.2
According to Eileen Barker, a preeminent expert on new religious
movements,
application of one label can, without any further clarification or
information, bestow respectability and privileges such as status and
tax exemption; the application of the other label can give a society
permission to damn an organization and to treat its members as
∗ Veronika V. Kravchouk is the Deputy Director of the Department of Religion at the
Russian Academy of State Service in the Presidential Administration. Portions of this Article
were presented at the Tenth Annual International Law and Religion Symposium, “Religious
Pluralism, Difference, and Social Stability,” held at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham
Young University, Provo, Utah, October 5–8, 2003. An earlier version of this Article appeared
in the report of proceedings of the 2003 CESNUR International Conference, “Religion and
Democracy: An Exchange of Experiences Between East and West,” held in Vilnius, Lithuania,
April 9–12, 2003, available at http://www.cesnur.org/2003/vil2003_kravchouk.htm (last
visited Mar. 26, 2004).
1. See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text and Part II.D.
2. Eileen Barker, Why the Cults? New Religious Movements and Freedom of Religion or
Belief, in FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK 1–2 (Tore
Lindholm et al. eds., 2001).
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lesser citizens, or even as non-citizens, denied what would
otherwise be considered their basic rights.3

In order to understand the government’s attempt to categorize new
religious movements, it is necessary to understand the factors that
distinguish constitutionally protected exercise of religious freedom
from truly dangerous extremist activity, as well as the difficulty of
correctly applying those factors.4
Traditional factors that are helpful in distinguishing between lawabiding new religious movements and new religious movements that
are prone to extremism include: (1) length of existence of the
religious group, (2) tendency to preserve territorial and/or group
isolation, (3) ad hoc financing, and (4) authoritarian or charismatic
leadership. However, Russian lawmakers should be mindful of the
various shortcomings of these traditional factors, as these elements
may result in over- or underinclusiveness in labeling potential
extremist activities and groups. Particular difficulties with the
application of these factors, such as (1) unavailability of information
and length of existence, and (2) vagueness and ambiguity of criteria
for identifying extreme religious movements, make this a process that
continually requires refinement.
Part II of this Article reviews Russia’s religious history, the postSoviet proliferation of new religious movements, the problems and
issues, real or perceived, attendant to the rise of these movements,
including extremism, and the government’s response to these
movements. Part III illustrates the government’s dilemma of
combating extremism while respecting religious freedom, and points
out many of the problems that arise from exclusive reliance on these
traditional factors. Ultimately, Russia is confronted with a tension
between promoting freedom of religion and protecting society from
extremism. As a first step, Russia should establish a committee to
analyze this problem countrywide and educate its citizenship
concerning religion and religious diversity. While increased religiosity
has undoubtedly had positive benefits on the country, the
widespread emergence of new religious movements has changed the
religious character of Russia in ways that potentially threaten the
country’s stability unless lawmakers achieve a workable balance in
identifying and dealing with extremism.
3. Id.
4. See infra Part III.A.
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II. THE CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE IN RUSSIA

Dealing with the appearance of new religious movements in
Russia requires a nuanced approach because of Russia’s unique
religious history. Significant world religious events, such as the
Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment, largely passed
unnoticed by tsarist and Soviet Russia.5 Consequently, the religious
pluralism deeply rooted and commonly embraced in Western culture
is, like democracy and capitalism, a relatively new concept for the
post-Soviet world. Understanding Russia’s unique religious heritage
is essential to understanding responses to new religious movements
and attempts to deal with extremist activities that have emerged over
the past decade.
A. Russia’s Religious Heritage
Prior to the adoption of Christianity in 988 AD, religious belief
in Russia was characterized by a pantheistic pagan worldview that
was expressed in art, custom, and religion.6 Russia officially adopted
Christianity in 988 AD, when Prince Vladimir of Kiev sent envoys
abroad to survey the religions of surrounding regions and return
with a recommended faith to augment the pagan traditions of the
people of Russia.7 Pagan Slavs who refused to allow their religious
beliefs to be dictated by Greek Orthodoxy initially met orthodoxy
with extreme resistance.8 Orthodox Christianity eventually gained
acceptance as it merged with traditional Slavic beliefs and grew to be
identified with the “spirit of Russia.”9 From 988 AD to 1917, the
Russian Orthodox Church reigned as the officially endorsed religion
of the Russian Empire.10 Although other traditional religions such as
Islam, Catholicism, Lutheranism, Judaism, and Buddhism were also

5. LYNN R. ELIASON, PERESTROIKA OF THE RUSSIAN SOUL: RELIGIOUS RENAISSANCE
IN THE SOVIET UNION 51 (1991).

6. Nikolay Andreyev, Pagan and Christian Elements in Old Russia, 21 SLAVIC REV.
16, 16–17 (1962).
7. See Orthodox World, A Brief History of the Orthodox Church: The Baptism of Russia,
at http://www.orthodoxworld.ru/english/istoria/2/index.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
8. Andreyev, supra note 6, at 18–20.
9. Id.
10. See Lev Simkin, Church and State in Russia, in LAW AND RELIGION IN POSTCOMMUNIST EUROPE 261 (Silvio Ferrari & W. Cole Durham, Jr. eds., 2003).
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present, they “enjoyed a substantially restricted set of rights and
privileges.”11
After the 1917 Revolution, the socialist state established a
progressive policy of secularization and strict separation between
church and state that evolved into a hostile and discriminatory
governmental stance against all religious denominations.12 For
example, the new secular state deprived religious organizations of
property rights and recognition as legal entities.13 The Soviet state’s
hostility to religion continued until the 1980s when Mikhail
Gorbachev, under his policies of perestroika (restructuring) and
glasnost (openness), began to ease the strong bureaucratic grip of the
government, thereby allowing for more initiative and freedom of
individual groups or enterprises,14 including religious organizations.15
By 1990, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic adopted a
law which conferred a degree of respectability on religion by officially
recognizing the right of registered religious organizations to obtain
legal entity status.16 According to Deacon Andrei Kurayev, a member
of the Russian Federation State Duma’s Expert Advisory Council on
Questions of Freedom of Conscience, the goal of this law was “to
free the life of religious organizations from interference by the
state.”17 This liberalized regime resulted in a quadrupling of the
number of religious organizations.18 Russians enthusiastically
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. By decree, “the Council of People’s Commissars on January 20, 1918
established [that]: ‘No churches or religious societies may own property. They shall not possess
the rights of a legal entity. All property of existing churches and religious societies in Russia is
declared to be national property.’” Id. (citing On the Separation of the Church from the State
and the School from the Church, Sobr. Uzakonenii, RSFSR, 1918, No. 18, art. 263).
14. See generally Oxana Antic, The Spread of Modern Cults, in RELIGIOUS POLICY IN
THE SOVIET UNION 252, 256 (Sabrina P. Ramet ed., 1993); Kathryn Hendley, The Role of
Law in the Russian Economic Transition: Coping with the Unexpected in Contractual Relations,
14 WIS. INT’L L.J. 624, 629–30 (1996).
15. See Howard L. Biddulph, Religious Liberty and the Ukrainian State: Nationalism
Versus Equal Protection, 1995 BYU L. REV. 321, 326–27.
16. See Biddulph, supra note 15, at 327–28; Simkin, supra note 10, at 262. See
generally Law of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on Freedom of Worship,
available at Religion and Law Research Consortium, http://www.religlaw.org/
template.php?id=74.
17. Deacon Andrei Kurayev, Freedom of Conscience and Freedom for Cults, TRUD, Aug.
13, 1997, at 1, 4, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Oct. 1, 1997, at 4.
18. Simkin, supra note 10, at 262 (noting that the number of religious organizations
went from approximately 6,737 in 1986 to 20,200 in 2001).
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received Russian Orthodoxy and other religious movements to fill
the “spiritual vacuum” left by secularized Soviet ideology.19
In many ways, Russian society was unprepared for the strong
appeal that religion would have as Russians gravitated to a variety of
both established and emerging religions.20 The general excitement of
the era resulted in a broad invitation of religious groups to
participate in many social institutions where these groups gained
significant access to and influence over potential converts. For
example, the Church of the Unification of the Reverend Moon
(Moonies) secured broad access to public schools where they
distributed religious literature to children, resulting in
unprecedented success for the group that would have been
unthinkable in any other country.21 Similarly, the Church of
Scientology gained access to many children affected by the
Chernobyl disaster through their humanitarian efforts and allegedly
conducted “auditing” of the children.22 This is in direct contrast to
Western countries, which generally allow a great deal of religious
freedom but still maintain restrictions on proselytizing underage
youth.23
The general lack of religious experience in Russian society made
it difficult for many Russians to distinguish between reputable
religious organizations and religious groups known abroad for
scandalous activities.24 The desire for new ideas and religions was so

19. Andranik Migrayan & Aleksandr Tsipko, Only Together Can a Weak Government, a
Weak Church and a Weak Society Be Strong, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Aug. 20, 1997, at 2,
reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Oct. 1, 1997, at 1–2; see also Antic, supra
note 14, at 254; Marina V. Vorobjova, Traditional and Nontraditional: Paradoxes of
Coexistence, paper presented at the 2003 CESNUR International Conference, “Religion and
Democracy: An Exchange of Experiences Between East and West,” Apr. 9–12, 2003, available
at http://www.cesnur.org/2003/vil2003_vorobjova.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
20. See generally Antic, supra note 14, at 253–54; Migrayan & Tsipko, supra note 19;
Vorobjova, supra note 19.
21. See ALEKSANDR SHCHIPKOV, VO CHTO VERIT ROSSIYA? [WHAT DOES RUSSIA
BELIEVE?] 145 (1998).
22. See id.
23. Sergei Filatov, Noviye religioznie dvezheniye—ugroza ili norma zhizhni? [New
Religious Movements—Threat or Norm of Life?], in RELIGII I OBSHCHESTVO: OCHERKI
RELIGIOZNOI ZHIZHI SOVREMENNOI ROSSII [RELIGION AND SOCIETY: SKETCHES OF
RELIGIOUS LIFE IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA] 401, 403 (2002).
24. Filatov, supra note 23, at 404.
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strong that many Russians fell victim to fraudulent schemes,25 lost
loved ones to cult inspired suicides, murders, abandonment, or other
abuse.26 Some of these so-called religious organizations were in
actuality terrorist organizations that sought to exercise psychological
control over their victims.27 According to Kurayev, “it became clear
very quickly that . . . in fact, sometimes people need to be protected
from religious organizations.”28
These publicized events lead to mounting concern over Russia’s
increasingly diverse religious makeup. With time, the terms “cult”
and “sect” began to acquire negative connotations as the pubic
began to associate them with “antisocial,” “criminal,” and
“dangerous” behavior.29 Writers and journalists often wrote about
“the negative effects of religious cults and neomysticism upon the
mental health and the life in general of young people.”30 Lawmakers
feared that the emergence of new religious movements threatened
their ability to maintain centralized control.31 Some have argued that
this negative response is partly due to Western anticult movements.32
In reality, however, “there has not been any evidence to suggest that
in Russia the overwhelming majority of new religions and their
members have been any less loyal citizens than the rest of society.”33

25. See, e.g., Viktor Panchenko, Khabarovsk Sect Chief Convicted for Money Laundering,
ITAR-TASS, June 27, 2001 (recounting events surrounding the conviction of a director of a
Scientology center for business and money laundering), available at LEXIS, News & Business.
26. See, e.g., Mikhail Doronin, Cults in Russia Preach License for Murder—Prosecutor,
ITAR-TASS, Aug. 27, 1997 (noting one prosecutor’s belief that “250,000 families have been
destroyed” by cults by a variety of outrageous activity, including murder, suicide and child
abandonment.), available at LEXIS, News & Business; Oleg Yemelyanov, Religious Sect
Subjected Children to Torment—Eyewitnesses, ITAR-TASS, Mar. 10, 1999, available at LEXIS,
News & Business.
27. Olga Kostromina, Totalitarian Sects Train Terrorists, ITAR-TASS, Oct. 28, 2003
(noting that some “totalitarian sects” are “becoming suppliers of operatives to carry out bomb
attacks” and cause psychological harm to their adherents), available at LEXIS, News &
Business.
28. Kurayev, supra note 17, at 4.
29. Marat S. Shterin & James T. Richardson, Effects on the Western Anti-cult Movement
on Development of Laws Concerning Religion in Post-Communist Russia, 42 J. CHURCH & ST.
247, 249 (2000); see also Barker, supra note 2, at 2.
30. Antic, supra note 14, at 254 (citations omitted).
31. See Shterin & Richardson, supra note 29, at 251.
32. See id. at 249.
33. Id. at 251.
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B. New Religious Movements in Modern Russia

New religious movements consist of new denominations,
religious groups, or spiritual trends or tendencies appearing during
the second half of the twentieth century, which may either be
independent of any previously established religious center or a fusion
of various religious faiths.34 The emergence of “new religious
movements” contributed to the increased diversity of Russia’s
religious landscape by attracting religiously inclined Russians to
explore the new aspects of religious belief offered by these various
movements. For many Russians, the term “new religious movement”
invokes stereotypical images of criminality, extremism, hypnosis,
brainwashing, fanaticism, and totalitarian sects.35
In January 1990, prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
sixteen traditional religious organizations and one nontraditional
religious organization were registered with the state.36 By January
1999, Russia housed fifty-eight registered groups.37 According to
more recent social statistics, new religious movements are the most
dynamic and fastest growing among all religions.38 Current data
suggests that around ten percent of the Russian population, or
approximately fifteen million Russians, belong to new religious
movements.39 Other data, spanning seventeen years of observation,
show that new religious movements continue to grow both
quantitatively and qualitatively based on their methods of attracting
converts and the growth of their financial strength.40
These new religious movements in modern Russia may be
divided into three main groups: (1) long-established foreign religions
appearing for the first time in Russia during the past decade, (2) new
34. NOVIYE RELIGIOZNIYE KUL’TI, DVIZHENIYA I ORGANIZATZII V ROSSII [NEW
RELIGIOUS CULTS, MOVEMENTS, AND ORGANIZATIONS IN RUSSIA] 163 (1998) [hereinafter
NOVIYE RELIGIOZNIYE KUL’TI]; see also L.I. GRIGORYEVA, RELIGII “NOVOVA VEKA” I
SOVREMENNOYE GOSUDARSTVO [RELIGIONS OF THE “NEW AGE” AND MODERN
GOVERNMENT] 69 (2002).
35. GRIGORYEVA, supra note 34, at 196.
36. Id. at 29.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 20–23.
39. Id. at 27.
40. See V.V. Kravchouk, Gosudarstvo i tserkov’ v Frantzii: otnosheniye k novim religioznim
dvizheniyam. Gosudarstvo, religiya, tserkov v Rossii i za rubezhom [Government and State in
France: Relationship to New Religious Movements. Government, Religion, Church in Russia and
Abroad], No.2 (1997), cited in GRIGORYEVA, supra note 34, at 21.
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foreign religious movements or “new age” religions formed within
the last 100 to 150 years, and (3) new religious movements formed
in Russia during the past decade.
The first category, long-established foreign religions, includes
religious groups lacking historical, ethnodenominational roots in the
territory of Russia or the former Soviet Union. These religious
traditions arrived in Russia from abroad during the past decade.41
They are typically in formal submission to their foreign religious
centers, which coordinate their activities. Numerous Protestant
groups, groups and movements from the United States, South
Korea, and other countries, and certain trends derived from Islam
and Buddhism, among others, belong to this category.
The second category, the so-called “new age” religions, first
appeared during the last 100 to 150 years. These movements
emphasize the dawning of a new century and typically offer humanity
an integrated perspective of existence that combines both physical
and spiritual elements.42 Their beliefs are not necessarily correlated
methodologically with any of the major world religions and often
consist of a synthesis of elements from various religious traditions,
forming eclectic doctrines that emphasize their own cultural and
religious ideas.43 These movements are very often led by a
charismatic leader and bring forward alternative programs
concerning the development of man and society.44 Examples of “new
age” religious movements include the Church of Scientology,45 the

41. See, e.g., Eleanor Randolph, Billy Graham Stirs Moscow’s Religious Spirit, WASH.
POST, Oct. 26, 1992, at A12 (describing early importing of American religion into Russia);
James Rupert, Religious Faiths Collide in Russia, WASH. POST, July 25, 1993, at A5
(describing Russian reactions to American proselyting).
42. See NOVIYE RELIGIOZNIYE KUL’TI, supra note 34, at 167–68.
43. For example, “new age” religious movements emphasize the dawning of a new age
or golden era for the chosen, the emergence of a new spirituality with the goal of combining
all religions into one, mysticism, the cosmos, globalism, futurism, changing conceptions of
God, and changing conceptions of the role of women in religious life. See GRIGORYEVA, supra
note 34, at 88–89.
44. See id.; see also infra Part III.A.4.
45. See generally A Description of Scientology, at http://www.scientology.org/en_US/
religion/description/index.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
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Church of Unification of the Reverend Moon,46 the International
Society of Krishna Consciousness,47 and the Bahá’í belief.48
The third category consists of new religious groups of Russian
origin, which first appeared or were structurally formed in Russia
during the past decade. These groups are ideologically related to the
new age religions discussed above. The most prominent religious
groups in this category are the Church of the Last Covenant
(Vissarions),49 White Brotherhood (Usmalos),50 followers of P.K.
Ivanov (Ivanovtzi),51 the Bazhov Academy of Secret Knowledge,52
the Church of the Family of the Children of God (formerly Children
of God),53 and Purpose (Namereniye), known as Purpose

46. See SHCHIPKOV, supra note 21, at 143–47; see also The Teachings of the Church of
Unification, at http://www.unification.org/overview_DP.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
47. See The Basics Principles of Krishna Consciousness, at http://www.iskcon.com/
basics/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
48. See The Bahá’í Faith, at http://www.bahai.org/article-1-2-0-1.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 2004).
49. This group is based on the belief of Sergei Torop, who believed that he was the
reincarnation of Christ and that his new name was Vissarion. SHCHIPKOV, supra note 21, at
167–70. The Vissarions believe that the world is hostile and impossible to accept, so they try to
break their contacts with it. See Vorobjova, Traditional and Nontraditional, supra note 19.
50. The White Brotherhood is an organization that began in Ukraine and consists
mostly of youth who operate by conspiracy and follow Maria Devi-Christos, who they believe
to be the Mother of Christ. Members of this sect practice complete isolation from the world by
avoiding newspapers and television and must consider their family members to be enemies
unless they too have accepted the “Mother of Peace.” See RELIGIOZNIYE OB’YEDINENIYA
ROSSISKOI FYEDYERATZII: SPRAVOCHNIK [RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION: A REFERENCE BOOK] 223–25 (1996) [hereinafter SPRAVOCHNIK].
51. This group consists of followers of P.K. Ivanov, who claimed to have acquired
special powers from the condescension of the Holy Ghost, including the ability to endure
severe cold, go without outer clothing in winter, and heal illnesses. See NOVIYE RELIGIOZNIYE
KUL’TI, supra note 34, at 170–73. This movement attracts followers by promising complete
healing of all illnesses and strong health achieved through the ritual of pouring cold water on
themselves outside twice per day. Id.; see also RELIGII NARODOV SOVREMENNOI ROSSII:
SLOVAR’ [RELIGIONS OF THE PEOPLES OF MODERN RUSSIA: A DICTIONARY] 108–09 (1999).
52. See Erika Allen, Conquering the Totalitarian Impulse, CATHOLIC WORLD NEWS, at
http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=21140 (last visited Feb. 26, 2004)
(“This group combines eastern mysticism with local folklore, and centers around ‘prophet’ and
leader Sobolyov, director of a spiritual-ethical center. . . . Sobolyov has developed a creation
myth in which the Urals host the origin of life, the coming of the Antichrist, and the end of
times . . . .”).
53. See generally Yana Afanasenko & Matvei Pismanik, ‘Tserkov’ Sem’ya Detei Bozhikh:
An Indigenous Russian Neoreligious Phenomenon, 30 RELIGION, ST. & SOC’Y 277, 277 (2002)
(discussing the Church of the Family of the Children of God and its emergence as part of the
“religious ‘Renaissance’”).
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Foundation for Human Self-Development.54 These domestic sects
tend to be more successful because of their ability to adapt to the
nuances of Russian culture and history and to more uniquely fill the
gaps left by the absence of an official state ideology.55
All the above-mentioned varieties of nontraditional religious
movements have cardinally changed the denominational spectrum
and altered the country’s religious situation, creating concerns and
questions among the Russian population and the country’s
traditional religions. The appearance and rapid spread of these new
religious movements prompted a new set of problems in church-state
relations.
C. Problems of New Religious Movements
As a result of highly publicized instances of religion-related
abuses56 and even terrorism,57 many Russians are concerned with the
frequency of religious proselytizing.58 Other general fears include the
spread of harmful organizations operating under the guise of
religious activity 59 and the stringent control of religious
organizations by centralized authorities located abroad.60 Because of
the troubles of extremism, in addition to these other concerns, the
government had to take steps toward eliminating the threat of
terrorist and extremist acts while balancing religious freedom.
.

54. Followers of Purpose have operated in Orenburg for ten years and are registered
with the Justice Department as a charitable organization. Lyudmila Meshchaninova, Evil
Purpose, VREMYA MN, May 21, 2003, at 10, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS,
June 25, 2003, at 14.
55. SHCHIPKOV, supra note 21, at 156.
56. See, e.g., supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
57. See Kostromina, supra note 27.
58. See Mark Elliot & Anita Deyneka, Protestant Missionaries in the Former Soviet Union,
in PROSELYTISM AND ORTHODOXY IN RUSSIA: THE NEW WAR FOR SOULS 197, 197–98 (John
Witte Jr. & Michael Bourdeaux eds., 1999).
59. See Vladimir Feodorov, Religious Freedom in Russia Today, 50 ECUMENICAL REV.
449, 450 (1998) (“Yet there is a real danger that naïve citizens may be misled by pseudoreligious groups which hide commercial aims behind religious or therapeutic slogans.”).
60. See, e.g., Duma Appeal on Dangerous Religious Sects, MOSCOW ROSS. GAZETA, Dec.
28, 1996, at 4 [hereinafter Duma Appeal.], translated in FBIS DAILY REP., Mar. 14, 1997,
available at Religion & Law Research Consortium (Dec. 15, 1996), http://www.religlaw
.org/template.php3?id=70.
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1. Extremism
Extremism is a political mentality that approaches radicalism,
maxims in behavior, and religious bigotry, and suggests personal
worldviews and goals that tend to deviate from those accepted in
society. One scholar defined it this way: “Extremism, as it is well
known, is characterized in the most general sense by adherence to
extreme views and actions which radically diverge from social norms
and rules.”61 Extremist measures commonly take the form of
violence, either directed outside the group, as against other people
or the government, or within the religious or political group itself, as
in the case of mass suicides, murders,62 or radical actions, such as
storming a Moscow theater and taking 700 hostages,63 fall well
outside the norms of behavior.
More generally, extremism covers an entire range of actions
employed to destabilize society by verbal or written threats or by
unlawful and violent acts, which are intended to alter the accepted
societal structure and achieve one’s personal or collective goals. The
law “On Counteracting Extremist Activity,” enacted in 2002, defines
several specifically prohibited extremist actions in an attempt to help
detail and address extremism.64 These actions include forceful
attempts to destroy the constitutional structure; undermine national
security; usurp commanding authority; create illegal armed forces;
61. Abdyl Abdulvaganovich Nurullaev, Religiozno-politichicheskii ekstremizm: ponyatiye,
sushchnost’, puti preoldoleniye [Religious-Political Extremism: Understanding, Essence, Methods of
Negotiation], in DESYAT’ LYET PO PUTI SVOBODI SOVESTI [TEN YEARS ON THE PATH OF
FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE] 58 (2002).
62. See Hannah Clayson Smith, Note, Liberté, Égalité, et Fraternité at Risk for New
Religious Movements in France, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1112 (discussing the “suicidehomicide of members of the Geneva-based Ordre du Temple Solaire in Switzerland and
Canada in 1994, followed by similar events in southeastern France in 1995”).
63. See Oksana Yablokova & Yana Valueva, Tears and Red Roses Outside the Theater,
MOSCOW TIMES, Oct. 24, 2003 (describing the Chechen situation on the one-year
anniversary), available at LEXIS, News & Business; Natalia Yefimova et al., Armed Chechens
Seize Moscow Theater, MOSCOW TIMES, Oct. 24, 2002 (describing Chechen conflict of 2002,
where Chechen guerillas took over 700 hostages and demanded immediate withdrawal of
federal troops from Chechnya), available at LEXIS, News & Business.
64. Fed. Law No. 114–FZ (July 25, 2002), Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2002, No. 30, Item
3031, Art. No. 1, LEXIS, Int’l Law Libr., RFLAW File (GARANT 12027578) (English)
[hereinafter Extremism Law]. See generally J. Brian Gross, Comment, Russia’s War on Political
and Religious Extremism: An Appraisal of the Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activity,”
2003 BYU L. REV. 717; J. Brian Gross, A Bend in the Road to Civil Society: The Effect of
Russian Anti-extremism Legislation on Not-for-Profit Organizations, 6 J. INT’L NOT-FORPROFIT L. (2003), at http://www.icnl.org/journal/vol6iss1/rel_grossprint.htm.
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carry out terrorist activity; incite social, racial, nationalistic, or
religious animosity; debase national dignity; create massive disorder;
engage in hooligan activities; and commit acts of vandalism
motivated by ideological, political, racial, nationalistic, or religious
hatred or hostility, or otherwise commit acts motivated by hatred or
hostility toward a social group; distribute propaganda of exclusivity,
advocating either superiority or inferiority of citizens on the basis of
social, racial, national, religious, or linguistic affiliation; display Nazi
or Nazi-like propaganda; or encourage or support others in
committing extremist activity.65
Unfortunately, a general definition of extremism does not
necessarily indicate the root of the extremist tendency—the
motivations for the antisocial behavior, whether political or religious.
In fact, the basis for extremist activity does not necessarily rest on
one foundational motivation but typically results from a combination
of factors.66 Among these are political, economic, ethnic,
psychological (e.g., fits of uncontrolled passion, revenge, temporary
insanity, or inadequacy), and religious motives. In its efforts to
understand this phenomenon, Russia has acknowledged this
multifaceted aspect of extremism. Russian Federation Ministry of
Justice official V.I. Korolyov recommends avoiding the term
“religious extremism” because it does not accurately convey the
reasons behind the extremist activity.67 Rather, the term “religiouspolitical extremism” more clearly conveys the motivation for such
behavior. Religious-political extremism includes activity motivated by
65. Extremism Law, supra note 64, art. no. 1.
66. Nurullaev, supra note 61, at 64–65; see also Kostromina, supra note 27 (defining “a
totalitarian sect as an authoritarian organization whose main objectives—power and money—
are attained under the cover of religious, cultural or other pseudo activities,” and thus
suggesting that there are a variety of potentially observable purposes behind extremist activity).
67. Geraldine Fagan, Russia: Three Draft Laws on Religious Life Yet to Reach
Parliament, KESTON NEWS SERV., Apr. 3, 2002, at http://www.starlightsite.co.uk/
keston/kns/2002/020403RU-02.htm. For example, the following exchange occurred at a
conference at the Russian Academy for State Service:
While he and his colleagues at the Ministry were “not supporters” of religious
extremism as a legal term, said Korolyov, it was nevertheless contained in Russia’s
10 January 2000 National Security Concept . . . and so required a definition. . . . A
noisy debate ensued once Igor Kanterov . . . asked Korolyov what he thought the
nearest Russian term for extremism (ekstremizm) was. “Violence,” replied Korolyov,
at which . . . Remir Lopatkin exclaimed: “No, extreme!” (krainy).
Id.; see also infra Part III.A. The inability to define extremism with exact precision gives rise to
one criticism concerning the traditional framework by which to judge religious organizations
and their likeliness to participate in extremist activity—vagueness.
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religion, or the use of religion as a camouflage, that is aimed at the
forceful alteration of the political system, the forceful seizure of
power, or incitement of religious animosity for political gains.68
In the minds of Russians, the rise of extremism and its
proliferation throughout Russia were inextricably connected to the
number and unfamiliarity of new religious movements.69 To some,
“the easy registration provisions in the 1990s led to a proliferation of
cults that preached violent, socially destructive doctrines.”70 For
example, organized gas assaults on subways in Tokyo in 1995,
attributed to the group Aum Shinrikyo, which had broadcast daily
“on one of Russia’s largest radio stations,” only increased the
perceived connection between new religious movements and
extremism.71
2. Other problems
In addition to the potential problem of extremism in new
religious movements, these groups also raise other concerns
connected with extrareligious activity, such as conducting taxable
commerce under the guise of tax-exempt religious organizations,
committing human rights violations, and espionage or other covert
political activity. For example, although increasingly accepted as a
religion, Scientology is also widely acknowledged as a method of
psychiatric healing and a commercial enterprise that sells specialized
textbooks to its adherents for profit.72 This use of the religious
organization for nonreligious purposes has arisen specifically in
attempts to avoid taxation. In a U.S. case, the Ninth Circuit Federal
Court of Appeals determined that the Church of Scientology does
not qualify for tax-exempt status available to nonprofit religious and
charitable organizations because its commercial income was used for
68. Nurullaev, supra note 61, at 59–62.
69. See Arina Lekhel, Note, Leveling the Playing Field for Religious “Liberty” in Russia:
A Critical Analysis of the 1997 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations,” 32
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 167, 194–95 (1999).
70. Id. at 196.
71. Maxim Isayev & Andrei Vaganov, Japanese Police Looks for Aum Senrikyo Chief,
NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Mar. 24, 1995, at 1, available at LEXIS, Russian Press Digest.
72. Boris Falikov, HPD: Problemi religioznovo statusa (na primere Scientologiya) [NRM:
Problems of Religious Status (by the Example of Scientology)], RELIGIYA I PRAVO [RELIGION &
L.] No. 2 (2001), http://www.rlinfo.ru/rip/2001/falikov2.html; Galina Krilova,
Scientologiya—religii ili kommertziya? [Scientology—Religion or Commerce?], RELIGIYA I PRAVO
[RELIGION & L.] No. 2 (2001), http://www.rlinfo.ru/rip/2001/krylova2.html.
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non-church purposes.73 In 1984, the Reverend Moon spent thirteen
months in a U.S. federal prison for failure to pay taxes, an action that
brought him more glory as a “‘martyr of religious persecution.’”74
Some “commercial organizations [have attempted] to penetrate
religious associations’ structure and merge with them in order to
utilize tax privileges granted them.”75 Additionally, some observers
claim that certain cults pose as charitable organizations in order to
obtain access to prison inmates to gain potential followers.76
D. Government Response to New Religious Movements
Due to the connection, whether real or perceived, between new
religious movements and extremism or other social problems, Russia
began to experience a backlash against many of these apparent abuses
by emerging religious movements.77 A variety of concerns over the
perceived dangers of new religious movements “took many different
forms ranging from paranoid xenophobia . . . to a more centrist
position.”78 The proliferation of anxiety over these new movements
led to the request for government intervention. In December 1996,
the State Duma sent an appeal to President Yeltsin detailing several
dangers posed by new religious cults, urging action to ensure
“religious security.”79
The many fears over the spiritual security of the country led to
the enactment of the 1997 federal law “On the Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations” (“1997 Religion Law”),
which provided a strict registration regime to mitigate the activities

73. Church of Scientology v. Comm’r, 823 F.2d 1310, 1315–19 (9th Cir. 1987).
74. See SHCHIPKOV, supra note 21, at 144.
75. Andrei O. Protopopov, Church-State Relations in the Russian Federation, 1996
BYU L. REV. 853, 866.
76. See, e.g., German Petelin, “Cops Won’t Go to Heaven”—Totalitarian Cults Sucessfully
“Tour” Russia’s Correctional Facilities, NOVIYE IZVESTIA, Aug. 19, 2003, at 1–2 (“For all
practical purposes, the penal system has been farmed out to destructive cults that are slipping
past the barbed wire under the guise of all manner of charitable foundations.”), reprinted in
CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Sept. 24, 2003, at 16.
77. John Witte, Jr., Soul Wars: The Problem and Promise of Proselytism in Russia, 12
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 10 & n.32, 11–17 (1998) (describing the backlash against
proselytizers from the West).
78. Lekhel, supra note 69, at 196.
79. Duma Appeal, supra note 60.
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of dangerous “sects” and “cults.”80 In an effort to address the
problems and concerns of the Russian public, this new law impacts
religious freedom in two fairly controversial ways. First, and
foremost, the Religion Law imposes allegedly burdensome
registration requirements and procedures on new religious
movements, in an effort to limit the flood of new groups.81 Second,
this new law seeks to identify traditional religious denominations in
Russia.82 Specifically, the Religion Law was enacted “having respect
for . . . Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions
constituting an integral part of the historical heritage of the peoples
of Russia.”83 The traditional/nontraditional distinction is important
because under the 1997 Religion Law, religious organizations that
have been in Russia for more than fifteen years or for more than fifty
years enjoy a higher-tier legal entity status that includes less frequent
renewal of registration, easier acquisition of property, and ability to
use the name “Russia” or “Russian Federation” in the official name
of the religious organization.
The growth and reaction to new religious movements and the
government’s response to these new groups reveals two things. First,
it is essentially impossible to conclude that religion is a separate,
distinct, foundational factor for determining extremism.84 Second,
the religion-based factor should be envisaged as framing the
motivational concerns of extremism and terrorism. Because religion
effectively “frames” the motivational concerns of extremism, one
should also note at least two other fundamental considerations: (1)
religious-based motivation brings out the most dangerous aspect in
extremism, and (2) religious-based extremism may be found within
any religion, including traditional “peace-loving” religions, although
80. See generally On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, Fed. Law
125–FZ (Sept. 26, 1997), ROSS. GAZETA, Oct. 1, 1997, available at LEXIS, Int’l Law Libr.,
RFLAW File (GARANT 71640) [hereinafter Religion Law]. See generally .W. Cole Durham,
Jr. & Lauren B. Homer, Russia’s 1997 Law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Associations: An Analytical Appraisal, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 101 (1998).
81. See Marina Thomas, Russian Federation Constitutional Court Decisions on Russia’s
1997 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations,” 6 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
L. (2003), at http://www.icnl.org/journal/vol6iss1/rel_thomasprint.htm.
82. Id. at 201–03 (discussing the potential differentiation between religious
communities caused by the preamble of the Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Associations); see also GRIGORYEVA, supra note 34, at 47 (2002) (discussing the significance of
the distinction between traditional and nontraditional religions).
83. Religion Law, supra note 80, pmbl.
84. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
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any move towards extremism tends to create specific variant features
of the original religion. In the words of one scholar, “Religious
extremism, as defined here, is destructive of any communal
structure. . . . All historical religions recognized the destructive
capacity of extremism and sought strategies to contain it.”85
The major characteristic of new religious movements, especially
in the initial stages of their existence, is their unpredictability in the
course of further development. It is extremely difficult, especially for
a governmental body that must respect the freedoms of conscience
and belief, to differentiate and identify potential extremist groups
from peaceful and harmless emerging religious groups. In reality,
only a minority of new religious movements actually commit
unlawful actions.86 Even the most ardent opponents of emerging
religions could hardly accuse the remaining majority of new
religions, consisting of thousands of foreign and hundreds of loyal
Russian religious organizations and groups, of creating social chaos
and unrest. Furthermore, extremism must be judged in context.
Well-established, worldwide religious organizations may be
considered “extreme” new religious movements in Russia simply
because they are new in Russia. Thus, in order to establish a policy
that both respects the Russian Federation’s constitutional
commitments to freedom of conscience and association, while
concurrently protecting citizens from dangerous organizations, the
government must accurately discern the extremist tendencies of each
religious group, not just in Russia, but also in the context of their
worldwide activities reputation.
III. THE DIFFICULTY OF IDENTIFYING EXTREMISM IN
NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS
Because the Russian constitution affirmatively protects the right
to freedom of conscience and belief for Russian citizens and
foreigners alike,87 the state must carefully craft its policies to avoid
85. See Charles S. Liebman, Extremism as a Religious Norm, 22 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION
75, 79 (1983); supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text (discussing problems of vagueness
and ambiguity of criteria).
86. See Shterin & Richardson, supra note 29, at 251.
87. See KONST. RF art. 13 (1993) (stating that Russia has no official state ideology); id.
art. 14 (affirming that Russia is a secular state and that all religious associations are equal before
the law); id. art. 28 (guaranteeing freedom of conscience, including right to profess,
disseminate, and share religious views).
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encroachment upon these rights. In responding to concerns about
abuses committed under the banner of religion, the state must be
mindful of the tension between freedom of conscience and
protection of society, and find a proper balance as it attempts to root
out extremism.
Scholars have noted several factors that may have a tendency to
lead to the creation of inappropriate social policy. First, the
emergence of nontraditional religious groups tends to awaken
intolerance in members of established religions.88 Second, there is a
tendency to overlook the nuances of each new religious movement
and to group all new religious movements together without
distinguishing between legitimate and harmful groups.89 The
combination of these two errors gives rise to many social problems,
such as an attribution of one group’s misdeeds to all new religious
movements, creating collective stereotypes concerning new
religions.90
It is essential that the government develop an accurate method of
determining which specific religious movements pose a threat to
society and which merely advocate the peaceful exercise of a given set
of beliefs. Traditionally, governments have employed certain factors
such as whether the movement is “close-knit, esoteric . . . with
strong internal solidarity, charismatic leaders, and apocalypticmessianic worldviews” to determine which movements may pose a
risk of extremism or are liable to use religion to abuse society at
large.91 Although these factors are helpful and useful in determining
which religious movements may give rise to extremism, they are also
incomplete. In order to determine the proper course of action, it is
necessary to consider these traditional factors and their weaknesses,
so that the government may know how best to proceed.

88. Bryan R. Wilson, Absolutes and Relatives: Two Problems for New Religious
Movements, in CHALLENGING RELIGION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EILEEN BARKER 13 (James
A. Beckford & James T. Richardson eds., 2003).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 13–14.
91. Thomas Robbins, Notes on the Contemporary Peril to Religious Freedom, in
CHALLENGING RELIGION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EILEEN BARKER 71, 76 (James A. Beckford
& James T. Richardson eds., 2003).
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A. Distinguishing Between Potentially Dangerous and
Peaceful New Religious Movements
The usual predictors for terrorist or extremist actions by or
arising out of any religion, whether Islam or Protestantism, are
equally valid for new religious movements and involve the study of
certain religious characteristics that have traditionally been
considered good indicators of groups prone to antisocial behavior.
Though these factors are useful in identifying extremist groups, they
are far from perfect. These factors include the length of the group’s
existence, isolationist tendencies, financing sources, and charismatic
leadership.
1. Length of existence
The volume of information available on a specific religion, its
doctrine, and its social adaptability are often directly related to the
term of that religion’s existence. Simply put, the older the religion is,
the more that is known about it.92 There are two relevant aspects of
length of existence: first, the length of existence as a world religion,
and second, the length of existence in a particular country.93 For
example, the Bahá’í belief is a new religious movement that has
existed for approximately 150 years and has demonstrated
development in a way that poses no threat to society.94 As of 1996,
the Bahá’í faith had nearly six million members in 174 countries.95
Thus, over 150 years and with an international presence in 174
countries, governments are reasonably familiar with this religious
movement. Conversely, when dealing with younger religious
communities, very little is known about how they will interact with
society long-term.
When uncertainty exists surrounding the determination of which
religious groups are prone to extremism, the length of time they
have been in existence is increasingly important. However, this is a
less than perfect measurement because the problem of insufficient
92. Cf. Jacques Robert, Religious Liberty and French Secularism, 2003 BYU L. REV.
637, 648 (discussing newness as a factor for determining “sectes,” which he defines as
potentially prone towards antisocial behavior).
93. See GRIGORYEVA, supra note 34, at 55.
94. See The Bahá’í Faith, at http://www.answering-christianity.com/Bahai_faith.htm
(last visited Mar. 25, 2004) (discussing the major tenets and history the Bahá’í faith).
95. See SPRAVOCHNIK, supra note 50, at 219–22 (1996).
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information about a new religious organization has been aggravated
over the past decade due to the inability of the state to properly
catalogue extremist activities.96 In the absence of accurate
information, public perception is often that younger religious
communities engage in “brainwashing” or “mind control,” break up
families, and pose a threat to “centralized control” and “basic
values.”97
However, a dearth of information caused by the relative newness
of a religious movement is not dispositive of the extreme nature of
that movement. Not every new religion is or will become extremist.98
Nor is every long-standing religion immune to extremist
tendencies.99 Thus, determinations based solely upon the length of
existence of particular religious groups can potentially create harmful
and incorrect public perceptions. Inadequate information about the
religious background of a new group can be the basis for spreading
inaccurate information across a society. Such inaccurate information
may exacerbate misunderstandings, increase societal tension, and
result in ineffective local and federal policies that adversely affect
legitimate religious organizations while failing to eliminate extremist
behavior.
2. Tendencies to preserve territorial and/or group isolation
The degree to which a new religious group isolates itself from
other groups, society, or the government demonstrates traditional
correlation with extremism and movements with “tight internal
social control, . . . intense communal solidarity, [and] strong social
boundaries isolating the group from the broader society” may be
particularly prone to violence.100 New religious movements that are
open and transparent to society or allow for easy access to their inner
96. See Russian Security Agencies Discuss Combating Islamic Extremism, BBC
MONITORING FORMER SOVIET UNION, July 11, 2001 (“The Justice Ministry does not
monitor the registration of extremist organizations since it is not its task to supervise them
systematically. According to the general prosecutor, the Interior Ministry and FSS [Federal
Security Service], for their part, have not worked out any methods of struggle in that
sphere.”), available at LEXIS, News & Business.
97. Shterin & Richardson, supra note 29, at 250–51.
98. See Jacques Robert, Religious Liberty and French Secularism, 2003 BYU L. REV.
637, 647–51.
99. Consider Islamic fundamentalist movements. See also id.
100. Thomas Robbins, Sources of Volatility in Religious Movements, in CULTS, RELIGION
& VIOLENCE 57, 59 (David G. Bromley & J. Gordon Melton eds., 2002).
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structure tend to engender the good will of the public and are less
likely to give rise to extremism. Conversely, complete isolation of
members of a religious movement facilitates the ability of a
controlling leader to exercise physical influence over believers, force
members to relinquish personal property for the good of the sect, or
engage in other harmful activities.101
The White Brotherhood, a new religious movement whose
members have been involved in and arrested for illegal activities,102 is
an example of a new religious movement that isolates its members
from outside influence and demands renunciation of social life and
secular careers.103 The White Brotherhood requires an ascetic way of
life for its members, including abstention from television, radio, and
most written news sources, partly to achieve “maximum isolation”
from the “Satanic energy” of the outside world.104 Similarly,
members of Aum Shinrikyo typically create an economically selfsufficient society that allows them to maintain isolation and,
allegedly, to create and train warriors to fight against the system as
the end of the world draws near.105
The government must, of course, be cautious with stereotyping
groups with isolationist practices because characteristics of isolation
are also present in many well-established religions. For example,
“[r]enunciation of property, asceticism, [and] obedience—all these
have been requirements of monastic life, including that of the
Orthodox Church, for centuries.”106 Taken alone as an indicator of
extremist tendencies, this criterion would allow the government to
designate any religion as extremist and would thus be overinclusive.
However, taken in combination with other factors, the degree of
101. See SHCHIPKOV, supra note 21, at 140–41. Some commentators, however, have
noted that increased accessibility to the Internet has lead to a decline in the importance of
isolation as a factor. See Bryan J. Yeazel, Note, Bomb-Making Manuals on the Internet, 16
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 279, 291 (2002) (citing Downloading Hate,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1999, at 1).
102. In October 1993, while allegedly awaiting the “end of the world” in Kiev, Ukraine,
Russian members of the White Brotherhood, including the leaders Yury Krivonogov and
Marina Tsvigun, were arrested for seizing a cathedral. See SHCHIPKOV, supra note 21, at 164.
While most of the members were released, Krivonogov and Tsvigun were sentenced to seven
and four years in prison respectively. See id.
103. Id. at 166; see also Sergei Filatov & Lawrence Uzzell, Sects and the Church, MOSCOW
TIMES, June 5, 2002, available at LEXIS, News & Business.
104. SHCHIPKOV, supra note 21, at 165.
105. Id. at 153.
106. Filatov & Uzzell, supra note 103.
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transparency and openness in the organization is a factor that
decreases the danger of extremism.
Conversely, new religious movements that engage in secret
rituals and secret multilevel initiations, or have special rules or
information intended for authorized use only, present
understandable concerns. Such behavior is an indication of potential
extremist activity to which society may react vigorously. The degree
of isolation versus transparency also relates to another important
factor: accessibility of religious groups to government inspection.
The more a religious group keeps its members isolated, the more
difficult it will be for the government to obtain information about
the group’s practices.
3. Financing sources and expenses
The majority of new religious movements are generated
spontaneously as like-minded individuals pursue a common belief—
that is, as an ad hoc group for which any financing is unplanned or
unanticipated. These groups usually gather in the private homes of
their members, organize in clubs, or go on picnics, and do not need
any financial support from the outside. Initially, they are not
intended to be a source of financial benefit for a leader or the
retinue, and financial blunders are virtually nonexistent at this stage
of their existence. Still, there are other forms of religious
organization in which material and private goods are laid as the
foundation stone.107 For example, the Church of Unification has
been described as a “gigantic commercial enterprise, comprised of
hundreds of firms all over the world.”108 In this case, private property
may pass from the hands of its members to those leading the
organization, or special fees and unpaid labor may be demanded.109
Internal and nontransparent financial structures facilitate antisocial
manipulation, such as exploitation of members’ labor.

107. Jerry Markon, Party Just Like a Cult, Experts Say, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 17, 1996,
at A5 (listing among the characteristics of a cult “deceptive recruiting and fund-raising
practices”).
108. SHCHIPKOV, supra note 21, at 144.
109. See, e.g., Uganda Seeks Interpol Help to Arrest Cult Leaders, XINHUA GEN. NEWS
SERV., Mar. 29, 2000 [hereinafter Interpol Help] (“Ugandan police confirmed more than 760
cult members had been murdered by the cult leaders who collected money from followers and
forced them to labor on their farms.”), available at LEXIS.
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4. Authoritarian/charismatic leadership
Another traditional factor used to determine potentially
extremist movements rests on the characterization of a religious
leader as “charismatic.”110 The definition of charisma in the new
religious movement context differs from its traditional meaning.
Charisma is a Greek word meaning a “special spiritual gift or talent
regarded as divinely granted to a person.”111 Buddha, Mohammad,
Baha-ulla, Blavatskaya,112 the Rerikhs113—all were charismatic leaders
and founders of their own religions.114 According to Eileen Barker,
Charismatic authority is, by definition, exercised in accord with the
dictates of the charismatic person and is, thereby, unbound by rules
or tradition. It is an authority that can be extended over all aspects
of the followers’ lives—what they wear, where they live, what kind
of work they do, whom they marry . . . . In other words,
charismatic leaders are not accountable to any other human being,
and, given that they can change their minds at a moments notice,
their . . . actions will be far less predictable than those that follow
an established tradition or a bureaucratically administered set of
rules.115

Because of the possible spiritual connection between a religion
and its leader, the state should tread lightly when categorizing new
religious movements according to their type of leadership. However,
the type of leadership may prove enlightening as to the nature of the
religious group. In the majority of new religious movements, a
charismatic leader is only a source of inspiration for followers, a sort
of symbol for the religious movement marking the moral and
spiritual level of the religious organization.116 However, other types

110. GRIGORYEVA, supra note 34, at 69.
111. WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 377 (3d ed. 2002).
112. NOVIYE RELIGIOZNIYE KUL’TI, supra note 34, at 91. Elena Petrovna Blavatskaya was
a writer, traveler, and theosophist who worked to develop a universal mythology that would
confirm a systematic path to esoteric religion and lead to a union of religion and philosophy.
She studied the secret powers of nature and people. Id.
113. See generally Roman Lunkin & Sergei Filatov, Rerikhianstvo: Sinteticheckoye
mirovosreniye ili novaya religiya? [Rerickhism: Synthetic World View or New Religion?], in
RELIGIYA I OBSHCHESTVO: OCHERKI RELIGIOZNOI ZHIZHNI SOVREMENOI ROSSII [RELIGION
AND SOCIETY: SKETCHES OF RELIGIOUS LIFE OF CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA] 450 (2002).
114. GRIGORYEVA, supra note 34, at 65, 69.
115. Barker, supra note 2, at 6.
116. Id. at 128–29.
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of charismatic leaders may focus on the inner structure of the
religious group more than on outlying believers, which may lead to
the formation of a rigid hierarchy based on strict obedience and
conformity to the proclaimed religious worldview, imposing strict
codes of behavior under the threat of extreme punishment.117 The
goals of this second type of religious leader are typically sociopolitical
and aimed at financial success. Under this latter type of charismatic
leadership, a real danger exists that those members within the inner
hierarchy will turn to religious extremism to achieve the group’s own
ends.118
B. Problems with and Difficulties in Applying These Factors
These traditional factors, unfortunately, do not predict with
complete accuracy which new religious movements are likely to be
dangerous and predisposed to commit extremist activities. Rather,
the government must address several difficulties in identifying groups
that tend toward extremism. By examining these weaknesses, the
government can more effectively identify truly dangerous
organizations and more closely target its efforts in a way that is
neither under- nor overinclusive.
1. Availability of information and length of existence
The first barrier to proper identification focuses on how to gain
the necessary information about new religious movements.
Generally, a new religion arises spontaneously somewhere in the vast
expanses of a country or penetrates unobtrusively from somewhere
abroad, and thus may pass unnoticed. Regardless of whether a
religion is old or new, it may pass into the country without
acknowledgement or fanfare. If a religious movement maintains such
a low profile, the public may only discover the existence of the new
religion by virtue of an extremist breach of order, which suddenly
appears in the newspaper headlines.

117. See GRIGORYEVA, supra note 34, at 65; Afanasenko & Pismanik, supra note 53, at
281.
118. See, e.g., Jere Hester, In Cults, Leaders ’ Charisma Reigns, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar.
27, 1997, at 5 (explaining that charismatic cult leaders “are experts at mind control and
manipulation”); Viktor Panchenko, Khabarovsk Sect Chief Convicted for Money Laundering,
ITAR-TASS, June 27, 2001, available at LEXIS, News & Business; Interpol Help, supra note
109.
.
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For example, even though the Pentecostals have been in Russia
since the beginning of the twentieth century, a relatively obscure and
unsuspecting Pentecostal sect in the Aldan region of Yakutia in
Siberia became well known to the public through a standoff with
government authorities after members of the sect occupied a city
administration building and demanded unpaid wages for work done
by members of the group in a timber processing plant.119 The
standoff became even more glaring when the sect’s leader, Vitaly
Kozarj, rejected an administration offer to pay 250,000 roubles and
demanded that the administration instead “‘shoot down members of
the sect.’”120 The administration brought a criminal case for the
seizure of the building and for the death of a ten-year-old boy, who
was beaten and then tossed out into the cold for attempting to
escape during the standoff.121
Similarly, Satanist groups typically remain generally unknown
until criminal actions call attention to their existence. The society of
Satan appeared in Moscow in 1989.122 Ritual murders in the Tula
region, however, brought their activities into the public spotlight,
when nine Satanists were tried for and convicted of murder.123
These examples demonstrate that detecting propensity for
extremist behavior requires taking into account more than the length
of the organization’s existence in Russia or its high profile in
society.124 There may be many relatively old but as yet unidentified
religious groups that advocate extremist behavior. Likewise, many
more recent but publicly identified religions are not a danger to
society.
To discover whether a movement may give rise to extremism, the
government should seek help from specialists and experts who are
capable of investigating and tracking the religious state of affairs
119. Oleg Yemelyenov, Members of Religious Sect Occupy Office Building in Yakutia,
ITAR-TASS, Mar. 3, 1999, available at LEXIS, News & Business.
120. Id.
121. See Yekaterina Rybas, Pentacostals Suspend Hunger Strike: Ban on Aldan Sect Will Be
a First for Russia, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Mar. 10, 1999, at 2, reprinted in CURRENT DIG.
POST-SOVIET PRESS, Apr. 7, 1999, at 13, available at LEXIS, News & Business.
122. See NOVIYE RELIGIOZNIYE KUL’TI, supra note 34, at 74–75.
123. See Valery Rudenko, 9 Satanists Accused of Murder Go on Trial in Tula Region,
ITAR-TASS, May 28, 1998, available at LEXIS, News & Business; Russian Satanists
Sentenced for Tula Ritual Murders, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Feb. 18, 1999, available
at LEXIS, News & Business.
124. See supra Part III.A.1.
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across the country. The government should first seek information
concerning unregistered religious groups through the assistance of
experts in the field of religion studies.
2. Vagueness and ambiguity of criteria
The second difficulty arises from the intricacies of the legal
system, which defines the criteria for unlawful extremist actions
vaguely, especially in cases relating to religious beliefs. For example,
the definition of extremism in the Extremism Law includes “the
activity of public and religious associations or any other
organizations . . . to plan, organise, prepare and perform . . . acts
aimed at . . . the propaganda of exclusiveness, superiority or
deficiency of individuals on the basis of their attitude to religion [or]
social, racial, national, religious or linguistic identity.”125 This
definition is potentially overinclusive because most religions generally
claim to be more correct than others or have some superior doctrinal
basis for their beliefs.
Similarly, ambiguity in defining the criteria to distinguish
between extremist groups and lawful activities acceptable for
traditional and new religious movements creates problems. In many
ways, seemingly normal and harmless activities or purposes may also
be preparatory for or associated with extremism, and, vice versa,
activities or purposes that may appear extremist in nature may be
quite innocuous. For example, sports clubs are widely popular
sources of humanitarian activity allowing children and young adults
to participate in various recreational and educational pastimes. As
part of these recreational or instructional activities, religious
communities may encourage their selected young believers to master
the techniques of self-defense—an acceptable skill. But viewed from
another angle, one may see this encouragement and instruction as
something more problematic—military training—and thus a form of
preparation for extremist activities.126

125. Extremism Law, supra note 64, art. 1.
126. One of the definitions of extremism under the recently enacted Extremism Law
includes “creation of illegal military formations.” See Extremism Law, supra note 64, art. 1.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It has always been difficult to uncover extremist and antisocial
activity while preserving religious freedom. New religious
organizations that participate in extremist activity are also the
organizations that take the greatest pains to veil such participation
and conceal witnesses. Thus, those that are most dangerous may
appear to be the most normal. Moreover, the preeminent feature of
new age religions is their fantastic adaptability and social mimicry in
conforming to norms of social life, both of which hinder any attempt
to distinguish them from harmless religious groups.127
There is widespread public doubt as to the sincerity of recent
religious communities. Many such groups seem to have adopted a
religious facade to disguise what is essentially a cultural, educational,
sporting, or welfare activity. Other religiously motivated and often
dangerous groups operate without registering with the state as
religious organizations. In this way, they are able to carry on
potentially dangerous extremist activity unnoticed and without the
protections afforded by a watchful state. For example, soon after the
gas attack in Tokyo, the Aum Shinrikyo religious group in Moscow
lost its status as a legally recognized religion.128
To increase the chances of properly identifying potentially
extremist organizations, the government should take two important
steps. First, the government should establish a committee on new
religious movements that has the ability to effectively examine the
religious situation across the country and analyze data to make
recommendations for local executives. Second, the government
should take steps to introduce and finance educational religious
studies programs so as to provide citizens with a broad background
127. See Eileen Barker, New Religious Movements: Their Incidence and Significance, in
NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE 24 (Bryan Wilson & Jamie
Cresswell eds., 1999) (“In some respects, the transported [new religious movement] might
appear only marginally different in whatever country it is operating.”).
128. Stricter Religion Bill Heads to Kremlin, MOSCOW TIMES, July 5, 1997 (noting that
the 1997 Law was justified as targeting Aum Shinrikyo after it carried out nerve gas attack),
available at LEXIS, News & Business; see also Sergei Filatov, Sects and New Religious
Movements in Post-Soviet Russia, in PROSELYTISM AND ORTHODOXY IN RUSSIA: THE NEW
WAR FOR SOULS 163, 166 (John Witte Jr. & Michael Bourdeaux eds., 1999) (“[T]he Russian
organization quickly faded, though there are still a few small groups of followers of the
‘Enlightened Teacher’ in some Russian towns who continue to idolize him.”); Ian Reader,
Dramatic Confrontations: Aum Shinrikyô Against the World, in CULTS, RELIGION &
VIOLENCE 189 (David G. Bromley & J. Gordon Melton eds., 2002).
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in new religions and potentially dangerous religious ideas. By taking
steps now to identify dangerous groups and to promote a broad
understanding of all religious organizations, the Russian government
can help mitigate and prevent the social instability caused by
extremist violence and antisocial behavior, rather than simply
addressing the violence and destructive results of extremism.
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